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Abstract—We describe narrow, erasure, hybrid and wide at-
tacks on fingerprinting schemes used for securing digital content,
and introduce new classes of codes, namely vector space block
design codes and δ−nonlinear codes, which can be used to defend
against such attacks by means of traitor tracing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we describe different attacks which can be
mounted against a digital fingerprinting system. We then
discuss the general problem of tracing descendants under the
various attacks and describe techniques that can reduce the
wide attack problem to solving a hybrid attack.
Fingerprinting (see [4], [2], [1]) is a technique that aims
to prevent the unauthorized redistribution of digital content.
Identical or very close copies of a document–software, images,
other digital media–are made available to a large number of
users of the system by paid subscription. The parts where the
copies differ, are where the fingerprint has been embedded
into the digital object, and it is the aim of malicious users
to discover these parts and construct rogue copies which will
still “function”. Traitor Tracing (see [5], [3]) schemes enable
the tracing of the identity of the user whose fingerprints were
used to construct rogue copies of the digital content, so that
they can be prosecuted.
Unless otherwise stated, we always consider a finite alpha-
bet Q, usually Fq, the finite field of q elements.
II. THE NARROW ATTACK
A. Coalitions
A coalition is a collection of users who wish to perform a
dishonest task within the system. We identify each user with
the codeword that he/she has been assigned–thus the code M
represents the collection of all users. There are two restrictions
that we will place on coalitions: (i) What can a coalition do?
(ii) How large can a coalition be?
Definition 1 (Coalition): Let C(M, ω) denote the collec-
tion of all possible coalitions of M with size at most ω:
C(M, ω) = {A ⊆M : |A| ≤ ω} . (1)
B. Descendants
A descendant is a word that has been constructed by the
ordered cutting and pasting of a collection of codewords from
M.
Example 1: Consider a coalition containing two codewords
(0,1,2,3) and (3,1,0,3). The set of all possible descendants from
this coalition is {(0, 1, 0, 3), (0, 1, 2, 3), (3, 1, 0, 3), (3, 1, 2, 3)}
or by slight abuse of notation {0, 3}×{1}×{0, 2}×{3}, and
include the original codewords themselves.
A fundamental measure concerned with sharing properties
between sets of codewords, is the spectrum.
Definition 2 (Spectrum): Let A ⊆ FNq be a collection of
vectors v = (v(1), . . . , v(N)). The spectrum of A at the z-th
coordinate is,
spec(A, z) =
{
v(z) : v ∈ A
}
. (2)
Definition 3 (Narrow Descendant): Let M be a code with
a coalition T ∈ C(M, ω). A narrow descendant d is any word
that is constructed pointwise from a coalition by selecting
symbols from the spectrum:
d(i) ∈ spec(T , i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (3)
The word d is a narrow descendant of the coalition T , denoted
d ∈ Ndescω(T ) provided, for 1 ≤ z ≤ N,
d = (d(1), . . . , d(N)) where d(z) ∈ spec(T , z). (4)
Definition 4: For any given code M, the set of all narrow
descendants from coalitions of size at most ω, is denoted:
NDescω(M) =
⋃
T ∈C(M,ω)
Ndescω(T ) (5)
Given only a descendant, how can we find a coalition that
could have constructed it?
Example 2: Let M be the code {0000,1111,0123,2301}.
We are supplied with a descendant 0101. Obviously, the two
sequences {0000,1111} could conspire to produce the de-
scendant 0101. However, another coalition, {0123,2301} can
also construct the descendant 0101,i.e., two disjoint coalitions
can produce the same descendant. Thus we can’t identify a
particular codeword which is guaranteed to be a culprit. Thus
M isn’t suitable for tracing descendants.
Let {T : d ∈ Ndescω(T )} be the set of all coalitions that
could construct the descendant d. The intersection of these
coalitions is the set of codewords that must have been used to
construct the descendant d.
Definition 5 (Trace): The set of codewords that must be
used to construct the descendant d is called its trace:
traceω(d) =
⋂
{T :d∈Ndescω(T )}
T . (6)
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C. Strength of Codes Resisting the Narrow Attack
It was shown by Staddon et al. [8] that if the minimum
distance of M is ≥ N(1− 1
ω2
), any descendant is traceable to
at least one traitor, usingM. In general, the strength of a code
determines the ease of detecting or tracing a coalition(see e.g.,
[8], [9], [10]):
Definition 6 (Tracing Hierarchy): Let M be a code and let
d ∈ NDescω(M). If M has a tracing or detecting property,
it can be classified into one of four categories (from weakest
to strongest):
• ω-FP (ω-Frameproof): No coalition can recreate a valid
codeword belonging belonging to a user not in the
coalition;
• ω-SFP (ω-Secure Frameproof): No two disjoint coali-
tions can create the same descendant;
• ω-IPP (ω-Identifiable Parent Property): Any descen-
dant can be traced to at least one codeword;
• ω-TA (ω-Traceable Ancestor): The codeword that is
nearest to the given descendant is a traitor.
Theorem 1 ([10]): The following hierarchy of holds for any
code:
ω−TA ⇒ ω−IPP ⇒ ω−SFP ⇒ ω−FP. (7)
For a descendant to be traceable to at least one traitor, the
code must be designed to be ω-IPP or better.
As the number of codewords gets large, the number of
descendants gets even larger, roughly O(|M|ωN ) (for small
ω), where N is the codelength and |M| is the number of users
for the system. The brute force approach to tracing traitors
thus quickly becomes computationally infeasible. McNicol and
Boztas¸ [7] have designed efficient randomized traitor tracing
algorithms for the narrow attack.
D. Elementary Descendants
Note that a linear code M has the following property:
f ∈M, d ∈ NDescω(M) ⇒ d+ f ∈ NDescω(M). (8)
We shall show that, more generally, descendants can be
related by their trace which is useful for constructing an
efficient tracing algorithm whereby manipulating a descendant
d with a set of operations we obtain an elementary descendant
d′. Then, a lookup table can be constructed in advance to
determine the trace for d′.
Definition 7 (Descendant Permutations): LetM be a linear
code, i.e., a vector subspace of FNq . We define a class of
mappings Π : FNq → F
N
q as follows:
1) Every π ∈ Π is a bijection on FNq . That is, π
−1 ∈ Π
exists.
2) For all codewords f ∈M, π ∈ Π ⇒ π(f) ∈M.
3) For every descendant d ∈ Ndescω(T ) and every coali-
tion T ,
π ∈ Π ⇒ π(d) ∈ Ndescω(πT ) (9)
Thus Π is the set of bijections which leave the code M and
the set of descendants NDescω(M) invariant.
Theorem 2: Let M ⊂ FNq be a linear code and π ∈ Π be
a descendant permutation . Then, the trace of the permuted
descendant is the permuted trace of the descendant, i.e.,
∀π ∈ Π,∀d ∈ Descω(M), traceω(πd) = π traceω(d).
We now state our main result on descendant permutations.
Theorem 3: Let M be a linear code with N = |Fq|. The
mapping π : v(x) → λv(ax + b) + g(x) where v ∈ FNq
and g ∈ M, with λ, a ∈ F ∗q , and b ∈ Fq is a descendant
permutation. Here, v(x) (resp. g(x)) is obtained by Lagrange
interpolation from v (resp. g).
Before an example, we introduce “square” Generalized Reed
Solomon Codes (SGRSs):
Definition 8 (Generalized Reed Solomon Code [6]): Let
X = (x1, x2 . . . , xN ), where xi are distinct elements of
elements of Fq, and let A = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ), where the
ai are nonzero (but not necessarily distinct) elements of
Fq. Then the generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(X,A),
consist of all vectors,
f = (a1f(x1), a2f(x2), . . . , aNf(xN )) , (10)
where f(x) ranges over all polynomials of degree < k with
coefficients from Fq.
A GRSk(X,A) is an [N, k] code over Fq with minimum
distance N − k + 1 and hence is MDS. In the special case
where X = Fq and A = (1, 1, . . . , 1), we obtain a square GRS
(SGRS) code, denoted SGRSk(Fq) with codelength N = q.
We now give an example of a 2-TA code which contains only
2 nontrivial descendants.
Example 3: The code M = SGRS1(F5) = {f(x) :
degx ≤ 1}, where the codewords are constructed by evaluation
on the ordered set XM = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Any of the 55 = 3125
words from F 55 corresponds to a polynomial of degree at most
4. How many are descendants? Consider the monomials xi,
and their evaluations into words:
v(x) v trace2(v)
x4 01111 {11111}
x3 01324 {04321, 01234}
x2 01441 {}
x1 01234 {01234}
1 11111 {11111}.
(11)
From Theorem 3 we can show that all polynomials λ(ax +
b)i+cx+d are descendants, for i = 3, 4, with cx+d forming
the codewords. However, the polynomials λ(ax+b)2+cx+d
with λ 
= 0 are not descendants . Therefore only 4× 5× 5 =
100 words are not descendants and 3125 − 100 = 3025 are
descendants–each can be related to one of the 4 allowed
monomials except for x2. Given any descendant d, we can
efficiently construct its trace by constructing a descendant
permutation π that maps d to one of the monomials x3 or
x4. If we apply the inverse π−1 to the corresponding trace,
we get the trace of the descendant d.
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III. MORE POWERFUL ATTACKS
A. Attack Classification
We now define the wide attack and also define its’ special
case sub-attacks.
Definition 9 (Extended Alphabet): For any finite alphabet
Q, we define Q# = Q ∪ {#}.
Definition 10 (Wide Attack): Let M have codelength N
and alphabet Q. The coalition T ∈ C(M, ω) can choose any
descendant d =
(
d(1), d(2), . . . , d(N)
)
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
d(i) ∈
{
spec(T , i), if | spec(T , i)| = 1
Q# else.
Since traitors can identify part of the fingerprint by checking
the differences in each other’s copy of the digital object, this
model is reasonable. We define the special cases informally
due to space constraints:
The Erasure Attack, where a coalition is restricted to convert-
ing the ith symbol to # whenever | spec(T , i)| > 1.
The Hybrid Attack, where for each coordinate, the coalition
selects whether they employ an erasure or a narrow attack.
Example 4: For a coalition with codewords 01234 and
00224 we exhibit some descendants below:
codeword
0 1 2 3 4 traitor1
0 0 2 2 4 traitor2
0 0 2 3 4 narrow
0 1 2 0 4 wide
0 4 2 # 4 wide
0 # 2 # 4 erasure
0 # 2 3 4 hybrid
descendant type
(12)
The narrow, erasure and hybrid attacks are special cases of
the full wide attack and need to be defended against if we are
to be able to defend against the wide attack. The descendant
sets EDescω(M), HDescω(M), and WDescω(M) can be
defined in analogy with Definitions 3, and 4 and obey:
Lemma 4: For any code M, with ω ≥ 2 we have:
1) NDescω(M) ⊂ HDescω(M).
2) EDescω(M) ⊂ HDescω(M).
3) HDescω(M) ⊂ WDescω(M).
4) NDescω(M) ∩ EDescω(M) = ∅.
B. Attack Reduction by Alphabet Boosting
Assuming that a code M is resistant to any combination of
erasure and narrow attacks, we can generate a new code M
that is resistant to a wide attack:
Definition 11 (Alphabet Boosting): Let f be a word with
length N over Q. Let ξ = {ξi}
N
i=1 be a family of N injective
mappings ξi : Q → Q where |Q| > |Q|. The alphabet
boosted word f is constructed by,
f = ξ(f) =
(
ξ1(f (1)), ξ2(f (2)), . . . , ξN (f (N))
)
. (13)
This still a word of length N but the symbols are now
restricted to a subset of the alphabet Q.
Definition 12 (Alphabet Boosted Code): Let M be a code
of length N and alphabet Q. Given the boosting map ξ, the
corresponding boosted code M is the set of all words ξ(f)
with f ∈M.
M = {ξ(f) : f ∈M} (14)
We keep the mappings ξ secret to limit the knowledge of
any ω−coalition to ≤ ω legitimate characters in the boosted
alphabet Q. Alphabet boosting doesn’t affect the distance
distribution or the resistance of M to a narrow attack. If the
coalition employs a wide attack, with a certain probability
the character they substitute won’t be a valid character, and
therefore can be considered to be an erasure. By choosing
Q large enough we can reduce the wide attack to an erasure
attack.
Lemma 5: Let M be a code over Q and M be the
corresponding boosted code over Q. The probability that a
coalition of size ω will select a valid character that is not in
its spectrum obeys:
p ≤
|Q| − ω
|Q| − ω
(15)
For the moment, we will assume that a coalition will be
successful in creating a descendant that is untraceable if any
of the coordinates are correctly spoofed, i.e., mapped to valid
symbols.
Theorem 6 (Wide Attack Reduction): Let d ∈ Wdescω(T )
be a wide descendant constructed from a coalition T . The
probability pH that d ∈ Hdescω(T ) is at least,
pH ≥ (1− p)N . (16)
Therefore, d can be traced using hybrid attack tracing tech-
niques with probability pH .
The proof is omitted due to space limitations. The main
implication of this theorem is that by varying p, i.e., by
varying the boosted alphabet size, a wide attack can be reduced
to a hybrid attack with a certain probability that we can choose.
C. Tracing
For this subsection we will assume that a coalition will
solely perform an erasure attack.
Definition 13 (Coalition Erasure Profile): Consider a
coalition T , let ET be defined by,
ET = {(i, spec(T , i)) : |spec(T , i)| = 1} . (17)
The erasure profile ET can also be constructed from the
intersection of the profiles from each codeword in T ;
ET =
⋂
f∈T
Ef . (18)
Note that, the profile Ef is the set of pairs{
(i, f (i)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
, i.e., the erasure profile of a
coalition containing only the codeword f . Given a descendant
d constructed under an erasure attack, the erasure profile is
simply the sets of pairs (i, d(i)) of the descendant that haven’t
been erased:
ET =
{
(i, d(i)) : d(i) 
= #, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
. (19)
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To construct a code that is resistant to an erasure attack
we impose two conditions: (i) ET must be nonempty for
all coalitions T ; (ii) To ensure that every coalition can be
uniquely defined by ET , we require the code M to have the
property:
T1 
= T2 ⇔ ET1 
= ET2 , ∀T1, T2 ∈ C(M, ω). (20)
Each component of the erasure profile contains tracing infor-
mation about the coalition that constructed it.
Definition 14 (Partial Trace): Given the Erasure profile of
a coalition ET , the partial trace denoted Bi,x for the coalition
T on the pairs (i, x) ∈ ET is,
Bi,x =
{
f ∈ M : f (i) = x
}
. (21)
The full trace can be obtained from the partial trace.
Definition 15 (Trace of Erasure Profile): Given an Erasure
profile ET , the intersection of all partial traces gives the
list (trace) of all possible codewords that could make up the
coalition T .
trace(ET ) =
⋂
(i,x)∈ET
Bi,x (22)
For a code to be traceable, we impose the requirement
trace(ET ) = T .
Lemma 7: The erasure profile ET is traceable to the coali-
tion T if trace(ET ) = T .
Proof: Let T be a coalition and let ET be its corresponding
erasure profile. Each codeword f ∈ T must be in trace(ET )
since f ∩ Bi,x 
= ∅ for each (i, x) ∈ ET . If there is no
other codewords in trace(ET ) then, trace(ET ) = T and the
coalition is traced.
This concludes our discussion of the erasure attack. We omit
the discussion of the details of the hybrid attack and the hybrid
trace due to space constraints.
IV. VECTOR SPACE BLOCK DESIGN CODES
We now construct a VSBDC, which is a type of Resolvable
BIBD, by using the set of all (ω − 1)−dimensional quotient
vector spaces of a vector space V . Instead of a detailed
definition, we give an example of a VSBDC with ω = 3.
Example 5: Let V be the vector space Z32 . The VSBDC
M = BDC(V,BV,2) is constructed from the set of all vector
subspaces of V with dimension 2, i.e. SV,2. There are 7 of
these; the ordered set SV,2 = {H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6,H7}
is:


〈001, 010〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H1
, 〈001, 100〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H2
, 〈001, 110〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H3
, 〈010, 100〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H4
,
〈010, 101〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H5
, 〈100, 011〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H6
, 〈011, 101〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
H7


. (23)
From SV,2, we can construct all the quotient vector spaces
BV,2:
V/H1 = {{000, 001, 010, 011} , {100, 101, 110, 111}} ,
V/H2 = {{000, 001, 100, 101} , {010, 011, 110, 111}} ,
V/H3 = {{000, 001, 110, 111} , {010, 100, 011, 101}} ,
V/H4 = {{000, 010, 100, 110} , {001, 011, 101, 111}} ,
V/H5 = {{000, 010, 101, 111} , {001, 100, 110, 011}} ,
V/H6 = {{000, 100, 011, 111} , {001, 010, 101, 110}} ,
V/H7 = {{000, 011, 101, 110} , {001, 010, 100, 111}} .
(24)
The set of quotient vector spaces BV,2 form a block design,
say B.
We can construct the codewords from the vectors in V . For
the vector 110 ∈ V , the codeword vB(110) is obtained as
follows. First coordinate: the vector 110 is in the second coset
of V/H1; therefore the first coordinate will be 2. Similarly for
coordinates 2, 5 and 6. The other coordinates all have a value
of 1.
vB(110) = (2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1) . (25)
Following the same procedure, the complete list of codewords
in BDC(V,BV,2) is
vB(000) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) ,
vB(001) = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2) ,
vB(010) = (1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2) ,
vB(100) = (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2) ,
vB(011) = (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1) ,
vB(101) = (2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1) ,
vB(110) = (2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1) ,
vB(111) = (2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2) .
(26)
Definition 16: Consider a coalition T of ω codewords from
the vector space block design code BDC(V,BV,ω−1). The set
AT consists of all vectors a in V that satisfy:
AT =
{
a : vBV,ω−1(a) ∈ T , a ∈ V
}
. (27)
The set AT is the V representation of the set of partition
vectors in the coalition T .
Similarly, we can also redefine the partial trace Bi,x.
Definition 17: Let M be the code BDC(V,BV,k). We now
represent the partial trace Bi,x (see Definition 14) by the
vectors in V that construct the codewords in T instead of
the codewords themselves. i.e.,
Bi,x =
{
a : v(i)BV,k(a) = x, a ∈ V
}
, (28)
where v
(i)
BV,k
(a) is the i-th coordinate of the partition vector
vBV,k(a).
We characterize the partial trace below.
Theorem 8: Let M be the vector space block design code
BDC(V,BV,ω−1), where V = Fnq . Let T ∈ C(M, ω) be a
coalition of M. The partial trace of the erasure profile ET is
the coset generator [AT ]V . i.e.,
ptrace(ET ) =
⋂
(i,x)∈ET
Bi,x = [AT ]V . (29)
Note that the VSBDC has the desirable property that any
coalition of size ω must have at least one coordinate where
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all codewords are equal (since every coalition T must have a
non empty erasure profile ET ).
This property enables a partial trace of the descendant which
will contain the coalition plus other codewords (spoof words).
We use concatenated codes to get around this problem.
Definition 18 (Concatenated Vector Space Block Design Code):
A CVSBDC M consists of an inner code MI =
BDC(FNIq ,BFNIq ,k), an outer code MO ⊂ F
NO
qNI
and a
scalar preserving homomorphism ϕ : FNIq → (FqNI ,+), i.e.,
a homomorphism ϕ which satisfies:
a,b ∈ Fnq , ϕ(a+ b) = ϕ(a) + ϕ(b),
a ∈ Fnq , λ ∈ Fq, ϕ(λa) = λϕ(a).
Its codewords are constructed as follows:
M =
{
vB
(
ϕ−1(f (1))
)
, . . . ,vB
(
ϕ−1(f (NO))
)
: f ∈MO
}
where B is the set of quotient vector spaces BV,k, and
f = (f (1), f (2), . . . , f (NO)).
We cannot use a linear code as MO as this re-introduces
the problem of spoof words at the outer code level (the
partial trace of a descendant will contain the coalition plus
some linear combinations of that coalition). We introduce δ-
nonlinear codes to get around this problem.
V. MODIFIED GENERALIZED REED SOLOMON CODES
Definition 19 (δ-Nonlinear Codes): A code M is δ-
nonlinear if for all subsets S ⊆ M with 1 < |S| ≤ δ the
sum
∑
f∈S f is not another codeword.
Equivalently, if M is defined over an alphabet with even
characteristic, for all S ⊆ M with 1 < |S| ≤ δ + 1, the
sum
∑
f∈S f is nonzero if M is δ−nonlinear. We give an
algebraic construction for such a code.
Definition 20 (Modified GRS Code): Let X =
(x1, x2 . . . , xN ), where xi are distinct elements of Fq,
and let Ψ : Fq[x] −→ Fq[x]. The Modified Generalized
Reed-Solomon code, denoted by MGRSk(Fq, X,Ψ), consists
of all vectors,
f = (Ψ(f)(x1),Ψ(f)(x2), . . . ,Ψ(f)(xN ))) ,
where f(x) ranges over all polynomials of degree ≤ k with
coefficients from Fq.
We can preserve the minimum distance of the original code, if
we are selective about the mapping Ψ. Choosing a permutation
polynomial for Ψ will maintain the distance distribution, but
won’t necessarily give us the desired nonlinearity property.
However, we have shown that the mapping
Ψ : f(x) → σ(f(x) · x)/x where σ is a permutation polyno-
mial, not only preserves the distance between all modified
codewords, but that it also has the desired δ-nonlinearity
property provided we use finite fields with even characteristic
and restrict the permutation polynomial σ that we use.
Theorem 9: Consider the code M = MGRSs(F2n , X,Ψ)
with codelength N . M is δ-nonlinear if it satisfies (i)-(iv):
(i) σ ∈ F2n [x], σ(x) =
r∑
i=1
aix
i,
ai 
= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ δ ≤ r,
(ii) Ψ : f(x) −→
σ(f(x) · x)
x
,
(iii) 2n > r(s + 1)− 1,
(iv) N >
(
δ + 1
2
)
s.
The δ-nonlinearity property ensures that, provided enough
block designs are concatenated, the partial trace of the concate-
nated code would only contain the coalition T plus other non-
codewords. The non-codewords can then be discarded leaving
only the coalition.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated powerful attacks against fingerprinting
schemes used for securing digital content and described codes
which can be used to defend against such attacks.
We have made use of resolvable BIBDs (Balanced Incom-
plete Block Designs) in order to construct new code families
we call VSBDC (Vector Space Block Design) codes. These
codes, used with concatenation techniques, are resistant to
narrow, erasure, and hybrid attacks. For the outer code in the
concatenation, we have defined modified GRS codes which
have a certain nonlinearity property.
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